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With the South Sudanese confl ict in its fi fth year in 2018, this paper seeks to 
not only examine the status of the civil war that has engulfed the youngest 
nation on earth but to also discuss the evolving narratives of its causes and 
provide policy recommendation to actors involved in the peace process. 
Having examined the continuously failing peace treaties between the 
warring parties, it is evident that the agreements have failed to unearth and 
provide solutions to the crisis and a new approach to examining the causes 
and solutions to the problem is therefore necessary. This paper argues 
that ethnic animosities and rivalry are a key underlying cause that has 
transformed political rivalry into a deadly ethnic dispute through vicious 
mobilisation and rhetoric. Therefore, it recommends a comprehensive 
peace approach that will address the political aspects of the conf lict and 
propose restructuring South Sudan’s administrative, economic and social 
spheres in order to curb further manipulation of the ethnic differences.
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South Sudan became the youngest nation in the world after splitting from 
the larger Sudan to become the Republic of South Sudan in 2011. However, 
their independence, like that of other countries in the world, came with 
a huge human cost following decades of intense conf lict between the 
Arab North and the non-Arab South. The intensity of the conf lict was so 
destructive that it caught the attention of the international community, 
who embarked on a series of mediation and negotiation processes between 
the North and the South. Following several protocols and agreements 
signed by representatives of the North and the South between 2002 and 
2004 (Jok 2015:1–5), these processes culminated in the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. However, as the 
separation process was taking place, several key issues that were responsible 
for mistrust among groups in the non-Arab South were not addressed. 
The main focus was on the conf lict between the North and the South and 
not the ‘frozen’ and ‘cold’ relations among the different ethnicities in the 
South. The referendum was overwhelmingly in favour of separation, with 
99% of the votes cast approving the decision. For the North, however, this 
marked a major downgrade of their country’s land mass as one-third of the 
land and about three-quarters of its oil reserves went to the new Republic 
of South Sudan (Ottaway and El-Sadany 2012:3). 
The objective of this paper is to revisit the status of and events surrounding 
the South Sudan conf lict from a historical and contemporary perspective 
and assess the consequences after five years of continued fighting. It also 
seeks to emphasise the role of ethnic animosity as the main underlying 
cause of the transformation from political rivalry to violent conf lict 
and the way in which other causes are attached to the ethnicity factor. 
Recommendations will then be provided to address the political, economic 
and ethnic differences in the country. The paper recommends an exit 
strategy that will ensure the gaps that allowed previous peace agreements 
to collapse are sealed by involving local, regional and international actors. 
It proposes a transitional authority that will help deconstruct the myth 
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that ethnicity is the basis of survival and instead suggests the establishment 
of a government that will regain public trust and confidence through better 
management and distribution of resources, restructuring and retraining 
the country’s security forces – ensuring territorial integrity and a state 
monopoly on the use of force. All of these may be achieved through the 
adoption of an elaborate constitutional reform. 
The data used in this paper was obtained through rigorous thematic analysis 
of existing literature on the South Sudan conf lict. The author used the data 
to identify the present status of the conf lict, and examine the narratives on 
the causes of the conf lict and on the various peace agreements. This way, 
it becomes apparent that ethnicity was not given the attention it deserves, 
as the focus was on ending the violence through political power sharing 
rather than addressing the ethnic and economic grievances. Based on the 
findings, an elaborate peace approach has been recommended: one that 
will dilute the short and long term impacts of ethnicity and allow the 
young nation to benefit from the fruits of its independence.
Status of the conflict
The government of South Sudan is experiencing a struggle over legitimacy 
and monopoly on the use of force. Weber’s definition of the state is largely 
based on the state’s ability to have a monopoly of force. This argument 
is supported by several realist theorists like Waltz (1998:28–34), some of 
them pointing out that although such control will enable the state to have 
authority over other actors, this authority should not be abused (Thomson 
and Krasner 1989; Krasner 1999). The moment a state loses control of the 
monopoly over the use of force, be it through a union, revolution, collapse 
or conquest, then the state is dead (Adams 2000:2–5). In the case of South 
Sudan, the situation has remained alarming as legitimacy and monopoly 
over the use of force is not solely in the hands of the current government 
since the opposition has significant support, legitimacy and a strong army 
of fighters which has taken control of several parts of the country.
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Weeks into the fighting that began in 2013, the United Nations (UN) 
estimated that thousands had been killed, and around 120 000 others 
internally displaced – of whom around 63 000 were seeking shelter at the 
UN Peacekeeping Base (UNOCHA 2013). The UN Security Council was 
called into action rapidly with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 
2132 that required an increase of the number of troops serving under the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 12 500 soldiers and 
immediate cessation of hostilities (UNSC 2013). To show the seriousness 
of the South Sudanese case, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon authorised 
the transfer of troops from other conf lict regions such as the African 
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations 
Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). 
Such a drastic response can be explained by the fact that although it is not 
very clear how many people had been killed in the first three months, aid 
agencies put the figure at over 50 000 people, which is higher than those 
who had been killed in Syria at the time – and that while the population of 
South Sudan is only about half of that of Syria (Martell 2016.)
The conf lict continued with heavy casualties witnessed until 2015, when 
a temporary peace treaty was signed (Blackings 2016:7). Cessation of 
hostilities did not last long as both sides accused each other of violating 
the terms of the peace treaty. Episodic violence kept erupting as the 
country remained unstable. Even the Southern parts that were relatively 
peaceful and known for their high crop yields came under attack. This 
affected food production in the country and diminished supply quantities. 
The government lost monopoly over coercive power and was unable to 
administer justice, provide basic services to the citizens and guarantee 
their security. Domestic sovereignty and more particularly the legitimacy 
of the political elites were highly disputed as the country was staring into a 
possible genocide (African Union 2014:106, 276).
In 2017, four years into the war, the number of displaced persons had 
increased to over 2.3 million people, and renewed fighting was taking place 
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in the Equatorials, Western Bahr al Ghazal and the Greater Upper Nile, 
causing the death of thousands more (UNHCR 2018). The government was 
accused of illegal detentions, restriction of media freedom and suppression 
of critics. The number of people seeking shelter at UN peacekeepers’ bases 
had also increased to 230 000 from 63 000. The situation was made even 
worse with the outbreak of a severe famine, especially in the former Unity 
state, which lasted for more than six months. The unchecked violence 
has seen war crimes and crimes against humanity committed, according 
to the African Union Commission of Inquiry. In 2018, reports by the 
Mercy Corps indicate that 1 out of 3 people in South Sudan is a refugee, 
1.9 million people are internally displaced while more than 2.1 million have 
f led out of the country. This shows an increase in the number of internally 
and externally displaced persons from 2 million to 4 million (Mercy Corps 
2018). Already, approximately $20 billion has been spent by the UN on its 
peacekeeping missions in South Sudan since 2014 – with little results in 
terms of achieving sustainable peace (Rolandsen 2015:355–356).
Targeted attacks on civilians, gender-based violence including rape, burning 
of homes and livestock, murder and kidnapping continue to be widespread. 
Aid convoys continue to be attacked and relief food looted by different 
warring groups. According to the United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), almost 50% of all children eligible to be 
enrolled are out of school. The violence continues to affect not just school-
going children, but also farmers and other workers who have abandoned 
their duties to find other means of surviving. The situation in South Sudan 
is among the worst in the world. Understandably so because the region 
became independent after three decades of fierce fighting with the North. 
Before the dust of the independence celebrations even settled, the civil war 
erupted, and as a result there was no adequate time to establish institutions 
and response mechanisms that could have at least reduced the effects of 
the war. This has seen South Sudan ranked the highest on the world index 
of fragile states that can collapse anytime. Inadequate funding has been a 
big challenge, too, in facing the conf lict. For example, the budget needed 
to respond to the crisis in 2017 was $1.64 billion, which was expected to 
help 7.6 million beneficiaries. However, only 73% of the total budget was 
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financed. In 2018 the targeted budget by the UN is $1.8 billion to help the 
internally displaced and $1.7 billion to assist those who have f led out of the 
country (Reuters 2017b). Given the failure to meet the full budget in the 
previous years, aid agencies may need to look to the private sector among 
other options, for sufficient funding. Lack of funds is further worsened by 
the excess spending and extravagant lifestyle of the political class (Waal 
2014:362–364).
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is warning that the prolonged war 
threatens a complete collapse of the South Sudanese economy if the large 
economic imbalances and exhausted economic buffers are not addressed 
(Sudan Tribune 2016). The economic situation in the country suffered a 
serious blow from the global oil price decline since 98% of the government 
revenue comes from oil exports. The South Sudanese Pound also lost 
around 90% of its value following the 2015 liberalisation of exchange rates 
that saw the country lose ground against other global currencies (Sudan 
Tribune 2017). In 2016 inf lation surpassed the 550% increase rate leaving 
the government with over $1.1 billion deficit in the 2016–2017 financial year 
(IMF 2017). Wages were significantly reduced while the prices of even the 
most basic products skyrocketed – inf licting more suffering on the people. 
For example, the price of sorghum had increased by 400%. (FEWSN 2016).
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Recent developments
The civil war has remained persistent since the collapse of the 2015 peace 
agreement that was mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) (Knopf 2016:12). During this time, several efforts 
have been made to attract the leaders back to the negotiating table, but 
all of them were in vain. In early May 2018, peace talks resumed in Addis 
Ababa, but by the end of the month the meetings ended without any formal 
agreements. Both parties rejected the proposal presented by IGAD on the 
sharing of government positions, the governance system of the country, 
and, most importantly, the security arrangements. 
On 25 June 2018, following intense pressure, President Salva Kiir and Riek 
Machar met in Khartoum for the first time in two years (The Star 2018). 
The meeting was concluded with the signing of a new peace agreement that 
called for a countrywide cease-fire as well as the sharing of government 
positions. The cease-fire was just hours later violated in the Northern 
part of the country with both parties accusing the other of the violation. 
The almost immediate violation of the agreement leaves analysts sceptical 
on whether this particular one will hold longer, given that previous 
agreements have not been honoured. Factors that threaten the new 
agreement are the creation of positions for four vice-presidents, and efforts 
to extend the presidential term again by three years – given that elections 
were supposed to be conducted in 2015 but were not. The resumption of 
oil exploration is another contentious point of the agreement about which 
the opposition are still expressing concerns. Apart from the cease-fire, 
the agreement package provides for a 120-day pre-transition period and 
a 36-month transition period that will be followed by a general election 
and the withdrawal of troops from urban areas, villages, schools, camps, 
and churches. Noteworthy, other groups have also found their way into the 
negotiations and will also have a share of the executive and parliamentary 
slots shared by the two main protagonists. Their presence when an 
agreement was signed in Kampala, Uganda on the 8th of July 2018 has earned 
them a slot among the proposed four positions of the vice-presidency. 
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While this peace agreement is a welcome move, it does not adequately deal 
with the reasons which had caused the collapse of previous agreements. 
We will later examine why these forms of power-sharing deals may not be 
sufficient to end the ongoing civil war.
Narratives on the causes of the conflict
The devastating consequences of the South Sudan conf lict have prompted 
several scholars to come up with narratives as to the circumstances that 
have led to the conf lict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, Doyle and Sambanis 
2000, O’Brien 2009). Some of these narratives touch on natural resources 
(especially oil), others on the access and availability of arms, or the role of 
Sudan in the conf lict. While these narratives may have merit, they fail to 
examine some of the most critical underlying causes of the conf lict. This is 
what necessitates the rethinking of the ways in which the conf lict has been 
presented academically. Below are some of the arguments and their gaps.
The narrative of oil fuelling the civil war in South Sudan has been highly 
favoured by various scholars who argue that the warring parties are keen 
on controlling oil and other natural resources (Ballentine and Nitzschke 
2005:6–7; Sachs and Warner 2001:827–838). Fearon and Laitin (2003:75–90) 
and De Soysa (2002:409) adopted different data sets, but also concluded that 
there is a causal relationship between oil resources and civil wars. Indeed, 
in the case of South Sudan, oil is the most important source of government 
revenue, and oil-producing states such as Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile 
have seen the worst of the civil war with some of the most intense combat 
operations reportedly happening in these areas. An investigative initiative 
conducted by Sentry, a US-based think-tank, gave a report alleging that 
oil revenues are used to finance and sustain the ongoing civil war and to 
enrich a small group of people in South Sudan (Bariyo 2014). This report 
was dismissed by the government spokesperson, Ateny Wek Ateny Sefa-
Nyarko, who during an interview with Reuters insisted that oil revenues 
are being used to pay civil servants, stating: ‘The oil money did not even 
buy a knife. It is being used for paying the salaries of the civil servants’ 
(Reuters 2014). There are also scholars, such as Sefa-Nyarko (2016:194), 
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Johnson (2014:167) and others, who contend that the civil war of South 
Sudan cannot be explained using the perspective that the natural resource 
curse is its primary cause.
There has already been much argument on the question of why and how 
income from natural resources, and not income from other sources – such 
as agriculture, would cause conflict. Often, however, the proponents of civil 
wars being caused by natural resources fall short of providing a convincing 
argument. The media tend to use expressions such as the war has been 
‘fuelled’ by the existence of natural resources but fail to explain how it 
happened. The literature concerned still needs to address three important 
aspects, the first of which is the possibility of spurious logic in regard to the 
place of endogeneity. That is, the potential that the correlation can actually 
be the opposite in the sense that natural resource dependency can be a 
product of civil war. Natural resources are in most cases location-specific, 
so even in times of war they remain constant while mobile sectors such 
as industries can f lee. South Sudan has been at war for more than half a 
century and it is only the oil sector that has been sustaining not simply 
the war but the economy. Secondly, the natural resource narrative needs 
to present, in a clear way, which conf licts are affected by which resources 
and how such resources affect the duration of a conf lict. In this regard the 
claims of Collier, Hoeff ler and Söderbom (2004:263) on the one hand, and 
of Doyle and Sambanis (2000:798) and Stedman and others (2002:12–18), 
on the other hand, can be compared. Thirdly, the argument that natural 
resources provide rebels with an opportunity to extort money from miners 
(Ross 2002:9–10) needs to explain why stricter mining security measures 
have not been put in place and why a group of rebels who is able to generate 
revenue by controlling natural resources would opt to engage in violence – 
unless there were an already existing problem.
The second narrative concerns the ease of access to arms enjoyed by the 
warring parties. This narrative has some merit and cannot be dismissed 
in its entirety. After successfully carrying out an armed resistance against 
the Arab North, the new nation was so overwhelmed by celebrations of 
their achievement that they failed to recognise the importance of complete 
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disarmament of the civilians at the very early stages of independence. 
These arms have no doubt played a crucial role in the continuation and 
escalation of the civil war, since not only the state security agencies had 
access to arms, but civilians were able to keep the arms they used to fight 
for independence and thus challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force (O’Brien 2009:11). The critical role that access to arms has played in 
the civil war has been recognised by state and non-state actors who have 
continued to call on the UN and the Security Council to impose an arms 
embargo on South Sudan. The impact of such a move on the country has 
not been discussed in this forum, but it is important to note that the United 
States in February 2018 recognised the impact access to arms has on the 
current state of South Sudan, and imposed an arms embargo on South 
Sudan – a move that prevents American citizens and companies from 
providing defence services to South Sudan (Reuters 2018). This narrative, 
however, does not explain what motivates a South Sudanese citizen to point 
a gun and kill a fellow countryman/woman. It also does not explain why 
the gun is being pointed at very specific members of certain tribes and not 
the other. 
The third narrative is about the role of Sudan in the civil war. Proponents 
of this narrative are keen on referring to past efforts by Khartoum 
to destabilise the southern region and even provide support to South 
Sudanese to carry out attacks in the region. A case in point is the support 
of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) by Khartoum between 1983 
and 2005 (Young 2006:17). This alliance saw the SSDF, headed by among 
others Riek Machar, supporting garrisons of the Sudanese Armed Forces 
and protecting oil fields in the Northern part of South Sudan on behalf 
of the Khartoum government. In exchange the SSDF received technical 
and military assistance from the Arab North, including arms believed to 
have been instrumental in the 1991 Bor Massacre (Canadian Department 
of Justice 2014). Sudan and South Sudan have also been caught up in a 
dispute over the oil-rich Abyei region which both parties insist belongs 
to their side of the border (Born and Ravivn 2017:178). Some may argue 
that this dispute proves an ‘intention’ by Sudan to support the instability 
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of South Sudan, but the counter-argument is that Sudan stands to benefit 
more from a peaceful South than from a South under civil war. One of the 
ways Sudan can benefit from the peace is that there will be good relations 
between the two countries, which in turn can lessen Juba’s support of rebel 
groups in Darfur and enable the three-year oil agreement between the two 
countries to proceed without any interference. Last but not least, Sudan’s 
involvement in the peace process can help rebuild the souring relations 
with international actors such as the European Union and the United States 
(Adam 2018).
In order to understand the South Sudan civil war, however, we need to look 
at more than just these three narratives. There are other relevant factors 
such as past events, ethnic identity and the role of individuals.
Manifestation of ethnicity in the South Sudan Conflict
At independence, South Sudan faced challenges similar to those faced 
by many other newly-independent countries of Africa. Competition 
for political power and differing ideologies among local leaders create 
a scenario where communities regroup within their ethnic cocoons in 
order to advance their cause (Cheeseman 2015:8–13). Such restructuring 
of communities have historical bases but are triggered by contemporary 
interests. Below we look at the nature in which ethnic rivalry manifests 
itself in the Sudan conf lict. 
Divisions within the SPLM
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement was established in 1983 under 
the charismatic guidance of the late John Garang. Guided by the aim of 
realising a New Sudan, the SPLM led a rebellion against Khartoum in a 
bid to realise a more secularised state (Warner 2016:6–13). The SPLM 
drew its initial members from the South, but as the liberation quest gained 
momentum it incorporated some members from the North under the 
banner of liberating marginalised groups in the North (Barltrop 2010:3–5). 
Ethnically, the SPLM was from its inception a diverse organisation, but 
within that diversity, the Nuer and the Dinka were the majority by virtue 
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of the sizes of their populations. They occupied polar positions within the 
organisation’s hierarchy – something that is still visible today (Kiranda et 
al. 2016:33).
As the liberation quest was on its course, the SPLM grappled with various 
challenges, ranging from organisational, internal and leadership to 
financial and ideological challenges (Janssen 2017:13). Finding solutions to 
these challenges became an uphill task for the SPLM leadership since these 
challenges were ethnicised – mainly as attempts by the dominant ethnic 
groups to find solutions that favoured their side. Thus, in the absence of a 
functioning united leadership, cracks emerged within the SPLM and signs 
of forthcoming splits began showing right from its inception. Along similar 
lines, Mamdani argues that cracks within SPLM provided a fertile ground 
for the continued conf lict as the antagonised parties were confronted by 
two main issues: one was the equal ethnic representation of ethnic groups 
in the struggle for power, and two, the path in which the power would follow 
(Mamdani 2014). These divisions paved the way towards the subsequent 
rivalries that rocked SPLM from within.
The first split that occurred at the nascent stages of the liberation struggle 
(1984–1985) was more ideological and was anchored on the determination 
of the path the liberation struggle was to take. On one side, Akuot Atem 
Mayem and Gai Tut Yang were calling for an independent South Sudan, and 
on the other John Garang, William Nyuon Banyi, and Kerubino Kuanyin 
Bol led the side that advocated for what they termed a New Sudan which 
would be a more democratic, secular and pluralistic country. Both sides 
received support from diverse ethnic groups but there were undertones 
that the quest for an independent South Sudan was an idea of the Nuer 
while calls for a New Sudan resonated well with the Dinka (Kiranda et al. 
2016). Although the claims and insinuations were muted, they triggered an 
unending slugfest between the two dominant ethnic groups and dimmed 
the possibilities of a peaceful South Sudan. 
The second split, which served as a litmus test on the leadership of the 
SPLM, occurred in 1991 after Riek Machar joined forces with Lam Akol, 
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a senior commander in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), to 
trigger a change of SPLM leadership. The two, together with others, called 
for the replacement of John Garang as the leader of the SPLM (Sørbø 
2014:1). They accused Garang of establishing close ties with the Ethiopian 
government, which they regarded as a move that would stymie internal 
reforms within the SPLM (Johnson 2014). This attempt did not come to 
fruition, and Riek Machar led a splinter group in the formation of Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Army-Nasir which continued to support the 
independence of the South from the North even though it received military 
and financial support from the government in Khartoum. Noteworthy, 
the confrontation between Riek Machar and John Garang has been viewed 
through an ethnic lens that pitted the Nuers against the Dinkas in a duel 
that has transformed South Sudan into a crucible of war. 
The night of 15 December 2013 witnessed the 3rd split, which originated 
from the SPLM. Just after two years of independence the young nation 
was yet again embroiled in a conf lict, and that has continued to date. 
Forces loyal to the president and those loyal to the vice-president were 
engaged in confrontations following weeks of intense succession politics 
within the SPLM Political Bureau (Johnson 2014:168). This time around 
it was President Salva Kiir accusing Machar of plotting a coup against his 
government just as the party was preparing its May 2013 SPLM National 
Convention which was supposed to discuss, among other issues, the 
party’s f lag bearer in the 2015 presidential elections, the term limits of the 
chairperson of the SPLM, the Constitution and a code of conduct (Janssen 
2017:12). An order to disarm members of certain communities within the 
presidential guard led to a mutiny that triggered revenge attacks of Dinka 
in Akobo and of Nuer at Bor (Johnson 2014:170). Although the alleged 
coup plotters were arrested, Riek Machar managed to escape from the 
country. But troops loyal to him continued with the conf lict. 
Ethnicity has remained an important variable in South Sudan’s politics. 
The tyranny of numbers enjoyed by dominant ethnic groups has become an 
important instrument of ascending to power. Ethnic mobilisations based on 
historical rivalries and attachments explain the composition of the warring 
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parties in South Sudan. Strong ethnic loyalty combined with a political 
system that allows winners to dominate government positions and get a 
larger share of the national cake causes political stakes to be heightened 
to the extent of violence. It is also important to note that other factors like 
availability of arms amongst civilians, competition for available resources 
and the role of Sudan – underscored features in contemporary discourses – 
have aided the continuation of the conf lict, but have not explained why it 
must always be a Dinka aiming a cannon at the Nuer and vice versa as it 
occurred in the Bor Massacre and other subsequent confrontations. 
The Bor Massacre and its implications on the conflict
In 1991, two years after the fall of the Berlin wall, when the world was 
beginning to experience an aura of democratic peace after decades of 
intense rivalry between world powers, a massacre with devastating 
consequences occurred in Bor, the capital of Jonglei state (Wild, Jok and 
Ronak 2018:2–11). Located on the east of River Bahl al Jabal (White Nile), 
Bor was predominantly inhabited by pastoralist Nuers with pockets of 
Dinka communities. Years before the massacre, there had been a series of 
inter-ethnic cattle raiding episodes between the Nuers and the Dinkas in a 
bid to increase their herds. These raids were initially conducted by means 
of spears and well-orchestrated ambushes, but later, with an increase in 
the number of guns, firearms became the common tools of the trade. 
Regardless of the raiding methods, it is important to note that cattle 
are historical symbols of social status, and their products which are of 
high nutritional value are important sources of livelihood among South 
Sudanese communities (Glowacki and Wrangham 2015:349–350). 
Prior to the massacre, there was a proliferation of arms among the civilians 
who had formed well-organised groups. While the Dinkas had the Titweng 
(a local militia), the Nuers had the ‘White Army’ that was originally formed 
to protect the cattle but upon gaining widespread success in their raids 
became an important asset in the political sphere (Young 2016). This came 
against the backdrop of visible rifts in the SPLM leadership that provided 
the avenue for Riek Machar to incorporate the Nuer white army members 
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into SPLM-Nasir, and with the support of the Khartoum government in 
the North, SPLM-Nasir orchestrated one of the deadliest massacres in the 
history of South Sudan. According to Wild, Jok and Ronak (2018), Riek 
Machar who was then entangled in ideological differences with John 
Garang, mobilised over 20 000 members of the SPLM-Nasir to carry out 
an attack against the Dinkas in Bor in what came to be known as the Bor 
Massacre. It saw the death of over 2 000 people of Dinka origin and the 
destruction of properties as well as other atrocities (Wild, Jok and Ronak 
2018). Even though Riek Machar offered an apology to the Dinkas in 2011 
when he was the vice-president, it is without doubt that the massacre left 
an indelible footprint of loss on the lives of the Dinkas, and it has become a 
political tool that has been used against Riek Machar in his quest to ascend 
to the highest office in the land (Chol 2011:3).
It could be easy to argue that a focus on the historical rivalry between the 
dominant ethnic groups is simplistic and superficial and that this would 
reduce the ongoing feud solely into an ethnic conf lict, as it is had already 
been labelled by segments of the international media. However, efforts to 
sustain an ethnic conf lict narrative have been quickly countered by the 
argument that the South Sudan government was a representation of diverse 
ethnic groups and that even after the December 2013 crisis which saw a 
number of people arrested on the allegations of an attempted coup, the 
president did not spare those from his tribe (Pinaud 2014:192). Indeed, the 
ousted and the current vice-president belong to the Nuer and the president 
is from the Dinka, but the presence of people of diverse ethnic origins in 
the government cannot be construed to mean a representation of ethnic 
interests, since African societies have the propensity to bestow ethnic 
responsibilities on particular individuals whose voices not only become the 
voice of the ethnic groups but also symbols of ethnic unity. Therefore, any 
kind of humiliation that targets these ethnic kingpins becomes an outright 
humiliation to the ethnic groups they represent, who then, on behalf of 




The first effort towards peace was spearheaded by IGAD with the support 
of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the course of 
2014 (Taulbee, Kelleher and Grosvenor 2014:78) The committee had set 
an ambitious target of 5 March 2015 as the final deadline for achieving a 
peace deal in the Sudan conf lict. However, the deadline passed without 
the target being realised. That same month sanctions were imposed on a 
number of individuals by the Security Council for their role in the conf lict. 
Interestingly the two main protagonists, Kiir and Machar, were not 
included in the list of six individuals that were sanctioned. More pressure 
from regional and international players demanding an end to the senseless 
killing led to a new draft in June 2015 that was followed by the threat of 
further sanctions by the Security Council if the parties involved did not 
sign the agreement by 17 August 2015 (Foreign Policy 2015). 
Two months after signing of the peace treaty the first obstacle emerged 
with the unilateral decision of President Kiir to establish 18 additional 
states above the then existing 10 states. This act was condemned, but a 
positive gesture from the President was made in December 2015 with the 
sharing of cabinet positions. By January 2016, the deadline for forming 
the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) had been missed, 
indicating the slow progress in the implementation of the peace accord. 
Finally, Riek Machar was appointed as the 1st Vice-President in February 
2016 although he was still in exile at the time. Further security agreements 
such as the demilitarisation of the capital city, Juba, were also made. Late 
July 2016, an attack by alleged government forces on a UN-protected civilian 
camp threatened to shatter the peace process (Blanchard 2016:2). In the 
following weeks, pockets of fighting across the country were witnessed, 
and the UN Human Rights Commission published a report on 11 March 
2016 asserting incidences of war crime that include sexual violence. 
The shaky agreement continued to hold, and Machar was able to return 
to Juba in April 2016 to take up the position of 1st Vice-President (Baker 
2016:20–27). However, fighting broke out between government forces and 
75
South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018
those of Riek Machar, forcing him to f lee the city once again, and marking 
the final collapse of the Transitional Government of National Unity. 
De Vries and Schomerus (2017:333–340) explain that the collapse of the 
2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conf lict in the Republic of 
South Sudan (ARCSS) signed by the South Sudanese government, the 
international community and members of the opposition was a result of 
a lack of political goodwill by the government and the opposition, both of 
whom had more interest in the amount of power they would retain than in 
implementing the agreement (De Vries and Schomerus 2017:335). Indeed, 
the excessive attention given to the government and the opposition in the 
ongoing civil war has overshadowed genuine grievances that ordinary 
citizens of the country are facing and that can motivate them to take up 
arms and fight. This is further worsened by the perception that rebels are 
illegitimate groups challenging the sovereignty of the country and the 
opposition’s far-fetched claim that they represent genuine grievances of the 
citizens. De Vries and Schomerus do emphasise that unless there is a more 
comprehensive approach to peace in South Sudan, sharing of government 
slots may not offer a permanent solution.
The latest efforts to bring an end to the brutal conf lict in South Sudan 
culminated with the signing of a peace agreement on 12 September 2018 
in Addis Ababa. This marked the 12th time President Kiir and his fiercest 
rival Riek Machar have entered into a peace agreement since the conf lict 
began. The unique feature of this new agreement is the involvement of 
two new actors, namely the presidents Bashir of Sudan and Museveni of 
Uganda. This is interesting in the sense that the former had been previously 
seen as a cause of the conf lict, but under the new agreement he is seen 
as part of the solution. This new agreement, however, still failed to tackle 
the underlying cause of the conf lict, which is ethnicity, as it facilitated 
sharing of government positions among the Nuer and Dinkas, so that 
the two dominant tribes were given the lion’s share at the expense of the 
smaller tribes. Already the conf licting parties have violated the cease-
fire agreement with the most recent case taking place on 24 September 
2018 when opposition and government forces clashed in Koch County in 
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the Northern part of the Country. This appears to be a continued sign 
of dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement – something that had 
earlier delayed the signing of the peace accord.
Findings
This paper has noted a number of issues that have either delayed peace 
or facilitated continued conf lict. Of these, the following are the most 
important.
There seems to be an attitude of treating South Sudan not as an independent 
country, but as an amalgamation of ethnic groups with the dominant 
groups having their way. This is evident from the manner in which the 
peace agreements have been handled, so that there can only be a cease-fire 
when the dominant tribes are satisfied with the positions its members have 
been awarded.
Despite several peace agreements being signed, there are still weak 
support systems. The institutional bodies established to ensure smooth 
implementation of the peace agreements have often fallen short of their 
mandate due to operational and institutional challenges that hinder 
them from operating efficiently. Some of these institutions are: the Joint 
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), UNMISS, IGAD, the 
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism 
(CTSAMM) and the Regional Protection Force (RPF). There have been 
concerns over, inter alia, insufficient funding of these institutions, lack of 
leverage, insufficient command and control structures, and parallelisms.
Constant violation of cease-fire agreements is also a consistent observation 
in the South Sudan conf lict. The key pillar of the peace agreements signed 
has been the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), yet in all the cases 
either one party has or both parties have violated this important clause. 
In some cases, the government even tried to prevent the reaching of cease-
fire agreements. They refused to commit to a clause submitted during the 
second round of peace talks in September 2018 suggesting how those who 
violate peace would be punished, and they impeded the smooth operation 
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of relief agencies by prolonging relief workers’ work permit processes 
(Reuters 2017a).
There is an absence of a serious commitment to end the conf lict. Despite 
the devastating consequences of the South Sudan conf lict, political 
leaders have failed to show goodwill to end the crisis (Keitany 2016:50). 
The main antagonists in the conflict bear political and moral responsibility 
to ensure that the life and dignity of the people of South Sudan are 
defended. On this however, they have failed. This extends to the regional 
and international actors involved in the peace process. The August 2018 
peace agreement supported by IGAD has seen some of the countries lacking 
neutrality. Uganda and Sudan are said to be aligned with the interests of 
the government and opposition, respectively, while Ethiopia and Kenya are 
involved in diplomatic and economic rivalry which may play out in the 
peace process.
Complex military-politics relations in South Sudan are also visible and 
cause a hindrance to peace. There have been strong affiliations between 
soldiers and political elites, specifically from their ethnic groups, to 
whom they seem to pay more allegiance than to the state. This complex 
relationship is not new and began long ago, during and after the struggle 
for independence (Rolandsen and Kindersley 2017:9–12). The ever visible 
military inf luence in state affairs has been further supported by the laxity 
of previous peace agreements to accommodate non-state actors in the 
transition period, and to train ethnic militias adopted into the national 
army for their new role. More importantly, both government and opposition 
military forces hold extreme positions – the latter calling for the removal of 
the president and the opposing the inclusion of opposition political leaders 
in the government.
Recommended approach to peace
The findings of this paper indicate that sustainable peace in South Sudan 
cannot be realised until key factors are addressed. These include an 
inadequate sense of nationalism due to the presence of ethnic identities 
stronger than national identity; a lack of strong institutions to ensure full 
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implementation of peace agreements; a lack of neutral security forces that 
do not take sides in the conf lict; and a lack of political will to achieve peace. 
The recommendations below attempt to fill these gaps in the following ways:
1.	 Providing President Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and other key figures 
involved in the current conf lict a negotiated exit from the political 
sphere of South Sudan. This is because they hold the highest 
responsibility for the on-going conf lict since they are at the top 
of the command chain and have failed to ensure that their troops 
adhere to the International Law of Armed Conf lict. Their exit will 
have to be negotiated, with due consideration to procedure and 
timing. This will help overcome fears of a possible repeat of the 
crisis as happened in Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Parties to be involved 
in this process should include IGAD, the East African Community, 
the African Union, the United Nations General Assembly, and the 
Security Council.
2.	 Establishing a temporary Transitional Authority under a Security 
Council Resolution that will include nominees from the political, 
economic, professional, diaspora, religious and cultural spheres 
of South Sudan and the international community. This authority 
may adopt a three-organ structure as suggested in figure 3 below 
in order to cover the important dimensions of the society. First is 
a Hybrid Court, consisting of foreign and local judges as well as a 
prosecutor, acting as the judicial arm with a specific mandate to 
oversee the activities of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and the local courts. Second is an Executive Committee that 
will oversee the day-to-day operations in the country. It will be 
comprised of a department of Homeland Security consisting 
of a strong peacekeeping force mandated to recruit, train and 
restructure the country's security organs: a department of Treasury 
that will deal with issues of financial management and acquisition; 
and a department of Social Services that will temporarily reform 
the health, education and basic infrastructure sectors. The third 
organ is an Advisory Council that will act as a legislative organ and 
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will be tasked with drafting a new constitution within a specified 
period, passing basic laws and approving government expenditure 
as well as conducting oversight.
Structure of the Proposed Transitional Authority










Office of the Prosecutor
Basic Services  
(Health, Education)
Oversight




3.	 Initiating the cessation of hostilities and a disarmament process 
in order to end the widespread supply of arms to civilians. Any 
party involved in violence after the declaration of cessation of 
hostilities should face trial under existing laws before retaliation 
by the other parties takes place.
4.	 Drafting a new constitution for the country that will require the 
establishment of a political and economic system that guarantees 
each and every South Sudanese equity and equality. The politics 
of winner takes all should be ruled out, while the separation of 
powers between the executive, judiciary, legislature and the local 
government must be strengthened. Division of labour among 





The recommended model of a transitional authority is not a new concept 
and it will not be the first time a country is put under international custody. 
Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz have written extensively regarding provisional 
governments, and they divide them into three categories: Power-sharing 
provisional governments, Incumbent provisional governments, and 
International provisional governments. Our recommendation is a hybrid 
provisional government that will see more international actors and some 
locals involved in managing the country during the transition period. 
We hope for reasonable success, as witnessed in cases as the following: the 
Provisional Government of Spain (1868–1871), the Caretaker Government 
of Australia (1901), the Provisional Government of Ireland (1922), the 
Interim Government of India (1946–1947), the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (1969–1976), the Transitional 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003–2006), the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992–1993), and 
provisional governments in several other countries .
These recommendations come against the backdrop of already failed 
attempts to bring peace to South Sudan through the sharing of government 
positions between the government and the opposition. This experience 
has in fact further worsened the situation, since new political players 
understand that in order to have a place at the negotiating table, one must 
first prove one’s worth through use of violence and blackmail. The new 
recommendations recognise that the conf lict in South Sudan is deeply 
rooted and cannot be solved overnight through a power-sharing agreement 
and a handshake. Such an approach may take longer but has a better 
chance for finding lasting solutions to the challenges in South Sudan. 
South Sudan’s independence came about under unique circumstances that 
differed from those in African countries with fair social, economic and 
education infrastructures. As a justification for the above-recommended 
approach, the following were taken into consideration.
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First, the recommended form of hybrid approach borrows from previously 
implemented strategies in post-conf lict countries such as Rwanda (post-
1994), South Africa (1994), Kenya (2007), Cambodia (1970–1973), and 
Namibia (1988–1990), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 
the United Nations established a tutelage to prepare political leaders (2003). 
Some of these countries have been under international trusteeship; others 
have adopted either an international legal system to try perpetrators of past 
violence, or a truth justice and reconciliation commission. Secondly, there 
is the consideration that this proposal could help to address the peace vs 
justice dilemma that keeps resurfacing when discussing peace in South 
Sudan. The recommendation does offer a smooth transition after the exit 
of the current set of political elites. It proposes a negotiated agreement that 
should avoid a catastrophic outcome as was seen in Iraq during the exit of 
Saddam Hussein and in Libya with the violent death of Muammar Gaddafi. 
The truth, justice and reconciliation process will give South Sudanese 
a platform to dialogue openly about their grievances and come to a 
consensus on what needs to be done to achieve justice in a manner that 
does not elicit violence. A further merit of this approach is that it should 
tackle deep-rooted structural weaknesses of the state by recommending a 
new system of government, which is compatible with the social features 
of the country and not just a power-sharing deal between the warlords. 
If a proportional system of representation is adopted, it will get rid of the 
‘winner takes all’ mentality that affects not just South Sudan but also many 
African countries. The new constitution, implemented with the assistance 
of UN-deployed forces, should help restructure and give a new meaning 
and philosophy to the security organs of the country. When everything is 
considered, what the people of South Sudan need, is an inclusive, unbiased 
and honest approach to peace – an approach that is not surrounded by 
political and economic ambitions of the leaders, but one that uproots the 
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